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title: Nigeria — Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access | World Payments Monitor
canonical: https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/nigeria/w1a/
publisher: Asymmetric Intelligence

### W1a Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access 1 gap Probable confirmed 2026-06-23

Nigeria operates a CBN-led, multi-tier, activity-based PSP licensing regime set by the December 2020 Licence Categorisation circular and the May 2021 capital requirements, anchored in BOFIA 2020 which classifies PSPs as Other Financial Institutions. Four principal non-bank categories exist — Switching & Processing, Mobile Money Operator (MMO), Payment Solution Service Provider (PSSP) and Payment Terminal Service Provider (PTSP) — plus Payment Service Banks (PSBs) and the Payment Service Holding Company (PSHC) structure for multi-licence groups. Critically only MMOs (and PSBs) may hold customer funds; PSSPs are technology/processing-only. There is no single EMI-style licence.

Open gap — wpm-int-1 No new CBN PSP/PSSP/EMI licensing-rule change identified within the 28 Sept-18 Oct 2026 window beyond the already-known June 2026 market-structure/localisation circular._no under-indexing note recorded_

Horizon · 2026-Q3 (± a quarter) PSSP/Switching TMS integration deadline_Adopted, not yet in force · Tier 1 source_

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026 270 words · last cycle 2026-10-18

#### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Nigeria operates a central-bank-primary, activity-based payments licensing regime. Under the CBN multi-tier activity-based PSP framework — established by the December 2020 Licence Categorisation circular and the May 2021 capital requirements under BOFIA 2020 — Switching & Processing and Mobile Money Operator (MMO) licences require ₦2bn shareholders' funds (Switching also carries a ₦2bn refundable escrow), while PTSP and PSSP licences require ₦100m plus ₦100m escrow. Only MMOs and Payment Service Banks (PSBs) may hold customer funds, and multi-licence groups must adopt a Payment Service Holding Company (PSHC) structure. No single EMI-style licence exists; activity-based categorisation is the structural anchor of the Nigerian payments regime, and the fund-holding versus processing-only split is determinative for how operators enter the market.

For firm-type purposes the regime cuts cleanly: bank-PSPs and PSBs sit on the deposit/fund-holding side, while non-bank PIs/EMIs operating as PSSPs are confined to processing and must partner with a fund-holding institution. The bank-partnership exemption is the standard route by which non-bank processors access fund-holding capability. This split shapes every market-entry, safeguarding and partnership decision in Africa's largest fintech market. The convergence dynamic visible in W6 and W13 — non-bank fintechs acquiring microfinance banking licences — is in part a response to this structural division, as operators seek deposit-holding status the activity-based categorisation otherwise denies them.

#### Outlook

The activity-based regime is established and stable as a baseline. The live tension is between fintech consolidation into deposit-taking banking and the CBN's operations-separation directive against the largest non-bank groups; how that resolves will determine whether the PSHC structure remains the dominant grouping model or whether structural separation reshapes group architecture.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

#### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Nigeria's market-access infrastructure continued to expand in 2026 even as the sector's structural rules tightened elsewhere. The Central Bank of Nigeria opened Cohort 2 of its Regulatory Sandbox Programme with dedicated tracks for Virtual Asset Service Providers and Data-Enabled Financial Services, continuing the supervised-testing route the CBN has maintained as part of its broader fintech-supervision infrastructure. This sandbox route provides bank and non-bank applicants alike a live-testing environment ahead of full authorisation, distinct from a final operating licence.

Separately, the Securities and Exchange Commission's July 2026 notice admitted seven named fintech firms into the Accelerated Regulatory Incubation Programme, granting Approval-in-Principle status rather than a final licence. This is a distinct market-access pathway from the CBN's banking-sector sandbox, reflecting the bank-PSP versus non-bank-PI/EMI distinction that runs through Nigeria's fintech authorisation landscape: banks and payment service banks access CBN authorisation routes, while non-bank digital-asset-adjacent firms are increasingly routed through SEC's incubation pathway.

Both developments point toward an authorisation environment that is widening its intake mechanisms even as it tightens the substantive rules, such as market-concentration caps, that apply once firms are authorised.

#### Outlook

Watch for whether firms admitted to the SEC's ARIP progress from Approval-in-Principle to full licensing, and whether the CBN's Sandbox Cohort 2 VASP track produces graduates that move into standard authorisation. Both processes will clarify how Nigeria's parallel bank and non-bank market-access pathways converge or remain distinct.

**1 earlier distinct update(s)**

Periodic update · new data 2026-08-25

#### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The Central Bank of Nigeria issued a market-concentration circular on 15 June 2026 that caps any institution's simultaneous exposure across consumer-issuing and merchant-acquiring activity: an institution holding more than twenty-five percent of consumer-issuing market share cannot also hold more than fifteen percent of merchant-acquiring share, or vice versa, with divestiture or restructuring required by 31 December 2026. This is the most significant Nigerian payments market-access intervention identified this cycle, carrying a hard compliance deadline that will test both bank and non-bank payment institutions currently integrated across both sides of the payments chain, a structure the evidence describes as general industry practice prior to this circular.

Alongside the concentration cap, the Central Bank revised weekly cash-withdrawal limits effective 1 January 2026, setting individual caps at 500,000 naira and corporate caps at 5,000,000 naira, with automated-teller-machine caps of 100,000 naira per day and 500,000 naira per week, while separately easing its posture toward cash deposits. Point-of-sale agent geo-fencing requirements were also revised, with the permitted operating radius widened from ten to seventy metres and the implementation deadline extended to 1 August 2026, an extension that suggests industry pushback against the original ten-metre requirement was a factor in the Central Bank's revised timeline.

A lower-confidence signal from a single source describes a February 2026 Central Bank Fintech Policy Insight Report proposing digital-identity access expansion, credit-data-sharing reform, exploration of ECOWAS licence mutual recognition, and a regulatory-sandbox test-then-codify pathway; this would be Nigeria's first sector-wide policy review since the Payment Systems Vision 2025 framework, but rests on a single Tier-4 source and should be treated as a lower-confidence signal of policy direction rather than a confirmed development.

Across these market-access changes, the bank-versus-non-bank distinction matters: the concentration cap applies to both bank and non-bank payment institutions, the cash-withdrawal caps bear most directly on banks, and the POS geo-fencing requirement is a non-bank payment-service-provider concern given its relevance to agent-banking networks.

#### Outlook

The 31 December 2026 divestiture deadline is the single most consequential date on Nigeria's payments-regulatory calendar for the remainder of 2026, and the coming cycle should clarify which institutions are affected and what divestiture or restructuring paths they pursue. The 1 August 2026 POS geo-fencing deadline is a nearer-term compliance point worth tracking for evidence of further extension or enforcement action.

**Sources and findings (5)**

1. T1 CBN — National Payment System framework; PSP/Licensing categorisation (cbn.gov.ng)
2. T1 CBN — Licensing framework for PSPs (SVF/PSSP/PSP) (cbn.gov.ng)
3. T3 [https://www.tetraconsultants.com/jurisdictions/nigeria-service-provider-license/ [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication]](https://www.tetraconsultants.com/jurisdictions/nigeria-service-provider-license/ [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication])
4. T1 [https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2020/ccd/approved%20reviewed%20guidelines%20for%20licensing%20and%20regulation%20of%20payment%20service%20banks%20in%20nigeria-27aug2020.pdf](https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2020/ccd/approved%20reviewed%20guidelines%20for%20licensing%20and%20regulation%20of%20payment%20service%20banks%20in%20nigeria-27aug2020.pdf) retrieved 2026-06-23
5. T3 [https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/overview-regulatory-framework-payment-service-psps-avwenaghagha [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication]](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/overview-regulatory-framework-payment-service-psps-avwenaghagha [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication])
