title: United States — Conduct, Safeguarding & Promotions | World Payments Monitor canonical: https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states/w1b/ publisher: Asymmetric Intelligence ### W1b Conduct, Safeguarding & Promotions Probable confirmed 2026-06-20 The US lacks a unified safeguarding regime equivalent to UK CASS or EEA PSD2. State MTLs impose 'permissible investments' requirements: licensees must hold qualifying liquid assets equal to outstanding payment obligations, backed by surety bonds and minimum net worth. Conduct is enforced through state regulators (examinations at licensee expense), federal BSA/AML obligations, and CFPB consumer-protection authority. There is no single federal financial-promotions regime for payments. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 319 words · last cycle 2026-10-18 #### Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions The US payments safeguarding mechanism operates through state Money Transmitter Licence 'permissible investments' — qualifying liquid assets equal to outstanding payment obligations — backed by surety bonds and minimum net worth, with no unified federal CASS or PSD2-equivalent safeguarding regime. These permissible investments function as the US customer-fund-protection mechanism, administered at state level with examinations conducted at the licensee's expense. This is a non-bank PI/EMI matter: it is the protection framework applied to customer funds held by non-bank money transmitters, and it stands in contrast to the UK CASS and EEA PSD2 safeguarding regimes. The fragmented, state-administered character of this protection is an under-indexed customer-fund-protection divergence for operators comparing jurisdictions, and it is asserted at Assessed confidence on Tier-3 sourcing. There is no single federal financial-promotions regime for payments; oversight is fragmented across the CFPB, the FTC and state attorneys general. On conduct, the CFPB issued a January 15, 2025 EFTA/Regulation E Compliance Aid clarifying that both non-bank P2P providers and the depository institution hold error-resolution obligations, and that private network rules offering less protection than federal law cannot be relied upon. This allocates error-resolution liability across non-bank P2P providers and account-holding banks, raising compliance exposure for P2P operators. The distinction here is explicit: the obligation reaches both bank PSPs (the account-holding depository institution) and non-bank providers (the P2P platform), and neither can rely on private network rules to escape the federal floor. #### Outlook The state permissible-investments model is established standing knowledge as the US safeguarding equivalent, and there is no current signal of movement toward a unified federal safeguarding regime. The CFPB Compliance Aid is at Monitored impact; its practical effect is to clarify existing EFTA/Regulation E obligations rather than to impose new ones, but it sharpens the liability allocation between non-bank P2P providers and depository institutions. Financial-promotions oversight remains fragmented, and that fragmentation is itself a standing feature of the conduct landscape. Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18 #### Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions The most significant conduct-related development this cycle is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's finding that all nine of the largest OCC-supervised national banks maintained policies between 2020 and September 2025 capable of amounting to politicized or unlawful debanking. The review was undertaken to implement Executive Order 14331, "Guaranteeing Fair Banking for All Americans," and its scope -- the entire top tier of federally supervised national banks, not a sample -- makes this a systemic conduct finding rather than an isolated institutional matter. For payment companies, fintechs and other non-bank entities whose own market access depends on correspondent or sponsor-bank relationships with precisely these large national banks, the finding has a direct bearing on counterparty conduct risk. A bank's reputational-risk-based account-access policy, applied inconsistently or on a basis later characterized as politicized, is functionally a conduct question about how fairly and predictably access to banking services is extended to higher-risk-perceived customer segments, including payment and crypto-adjacent businesses that have historically been more exposed to de-risking decisions of this kind. No enforcement action or formal remediation order has been identified as flowing from the OCC's findings as of this cycle. That absence is itself worth noting rather than passing over: a published systemic finding without an accompanying remediation mandate leaves open whether the OCC's intended follow-through will take the form of supervisory guidance, bank-specific remediation plans, or a future rulemaking, each of which would carry different practical consequences for how account-access conduct is governed going forward. #### Outlook The central question for this module going forward is whether the OCC's debanking findings translate into supervisory guidance, remediation requirements, or rulemaking, none of which had been announced as of this cycle. Entities dependent on sponsor-bank relationships with the nine reviewed institutions should anticipate continued supervisory attention to account-access conduct, independent of whether any formal action against a specific bank ultimately follows. **1 earlier distinct update(s)** Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10 #### Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions US customer-fund protection for payments operates through the same state Money Transmitter Licence framework that governs market access, rather than through a unified federal safeguarding regime. The operative mechanism is the 'permissible investments' requirement embedded in state MTL regimes: licensees must hold qualifying liquid assets equal to their outstanding payment obligations, backed additionally by surety bonds and minimum tangible net worth, with compliance examined state-by-state at the licensee's expense. This stands in clear contrast to the UK's CASS safeguarding regime and the EEA's PSD2 safeguarding rules, both of which operate as unified frameworks; the US model is fragmented and state-administered, a divergence in customer-fund protection that is under-indexed relative to its practical significance for operators comparing jurisdictions. There is similarly no single federal financial-promotions regime for payments products: oversight of promotional conduct is split across the CFPB, the FTC, and state attorneys general, rather than concentrated in one supervisory body. On conduct specifically, the CFPB issued a Compliance Aid on January 15, 2025 addressing Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E obligations for peer-to-peer payment services. The Aid clarifies that both non-bank P2P providers and the depository institutions that hold the underlying consumer accounts carry error-resolution obligations under Regulation E, and — significantly for platform operators — that private network rules purporting to offer less consumer protection than federal law cannot be relied upon to limit liability. This allocates error-resolution exposure across both non-bank P2P operators and account-holding banks, raising compliance exposure specifically for the non-bank side of P2P arrangements. #### Outlook Absent a move toward a unified federal safeguarding or financial-promotions regime, the state-by-state permissible-investments model and the CFPB/FTC/state-AG conduct split are likely to remain the standing US architecture for the near term; the practical compliance question for P2P and non-bank operators is how strictly the January 2025 EFTA/Reg E Compliance Aid is enforced in practice. 1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown. **Sources and findings (4)** 1. T1 State MSB/MTL statutes & FinCEN MSB registration (fincen.gov) — State MTL holders must maintain permissible investments — qualifying liquid assets equal to outstanding payment obligations — alongside surety bonds and minimum tangible net worth, functioning as the US safeguarding mechanism. 2. T2 Wolters Kluwer — As part of MTL processes, licensees may be subject to examinations by state regulators (generally at the licensee's expense) and must submit audited reports including executive background, surety bonds, minimum net worth and/or collateral requirements. 3. T2 finhost.io / FinCEN — Federally, MSBs must maintain an anti-money-laundering program, keep records of certain transactions, conduct KYC/KYB, monitor transactions and file SARs to FinCEN, under the BSA (31 CFR 1010.100(ff)). 4. T2 CFPB regulations (consumerfinance.gov) — CFPB issued a January 15, 2025 EFTA/Regulation E Compliance Aid clarifying that both non-bank P2P payment providers and the depository institution holding the consumer's account have error-resolution obligations, and that private network rules offering less protection than federal law cannot be relied upon.