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Georgia has no standalone payments-specific operational-resilience statute analogous to DORA; resilience oversight flows through DBF's third-party service-provider examination authority over state-chartered banks/credit unions and federal FFIEC/BSA-linked cyber-incident reporting obligations. No GA-specific critical-third-party payments infrastructure regime was located beyond this bank-service-contract framework.
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Outlook
No Georgia-specific critical-third-party payments-infrastructure regime was identified beyond this bank-service-contract framework; resilience oversight for Georgia's payments sector remains a function of federal banking-agency examination cycles rather than a dedicated state payments-resilience rulebook.
no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief
Sources and findings (1 unique sources · R-3/R-4)
- [W3-E1] T1 Derived: Confirmed in_force Collapsed 3× useshttps://dbf.georgia.gov/document/document/2023-dbf-final-rulemaking-7-7-23-0/download re-verified
Each third-party service provider entering a bank service contract with a state-chartered bank is subject to DBF examination and regulation as if it were a state financial institution, under O.C.G.A. § 7-1-72.