#
Rwanda's payment-systems legal basis remains Law No. 061/2021 (BNR licensing) plus new instant-payment directives; a parallel Virtual Asset Law (No. 023/2026) now creates a CMA/BNR dual-track legal basis for virtual-asset-linked payment activity.
The localisation requirement — a Rwandan-incorporated entity plus a resident CEO — is the analytically decisive feature for any foreign payments operator, as it defines the market-access gate and shapes foreign-fintech entry strategy.
A transition obligation sits alongside the standing regime. Article 60 of Regulation N° 74/2023 required all currently licensed PSPs to apply for licence recategorisation by 18 September 2024, one year from gazette publication, with non-compliance risking licence revocation. This is carried as a historical event: the deadline was presented prospectively as of August 2024, and the outcome and current June 2026 compliance status were not verified this cycle. The transition therefore carries residual risk for incumbent licensees and revocation exposure for any non-compliers, but post-deadline supervisory outcomes such as revocations or extensions remain under-covered in the available source base.
Outlook
The W1a standing position is established and stable. The open item is supervisory follow-through on recategorisation: confirming the post-September-2024 compliance outcome would close the principal gap in this module. No change to the core licensing architecture is indicated this cycle.
Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access
Rwanda's National Bank issued Directive No. 45/2026, which requires payment-system operators to focus exclusively on payment infrastructure rather than offering electronic-money services directly to the public. The immediate consequence, confirmed across secondary reporting, is that RSwitch, the operator of Rwanda's national eKash payment infrastructure, is discontinuing the standalone eKash wallet app that had previously let it offer electronic-money services directly to end users. This is squarely a nonbank-PI/EMI-scoped development: the directive targets the class of payment-system operator that is not itself a bank, and it draws a bright line between operating shared payment infrastructure, which remains permitted and indeed central to Rwanda's national payments strategy, and directly holding customer e-money balances or offering a consumer-facing wallet product, which is now foreclosed to an operator in RSwitch's position.
This bright-line separation is analytically significant for how Rwanda's payment-system architecture is likely to evolve. By requiring infrastructure operators to divest consumer-facing e-money functions, BNR is effectively reserving direct-to-consumer electronic-money provision for banks and other licensed entities positioned as banks or bank-affiliated PSPs, rather than allowing the operator of the shared national rail to also compete as a wallet provider on that same rail. This has an elevated-impact rating in the sourcing reviewed this cycle, reflecting the structural nature of the change rather than a narrow procedural update. The directive's exact issuance date, however, is reported inconsistently across the secondary sources reviewed, with some describing 9 January 2026 and others 9 June 2026; no direct bnr.rw primary-source retrieval was achieved this cycle, and this date discrepancy is carried forward as an unresolved sourcing gap rather than resolved by inference.
A second, related market-access item concerns Regulation 70/2024, which appears from tier-4 aggregator and directory-level sourcing to establish a payment-service-provider recategorisation regime, but no tier-one anchor for its operative text was reached this cycle. Absent primary-source confirmation, this item is carried as a standing coverage gap: its existence is noted, but its substantive content cannot be responsibly narrated beyond what tier-four secondary listings describe.
Outlook
The principal item to resolve next cycle is direct confirmation of Directive No. 45/2026's precise issuance date, scope, and any transition arrangements, ideally against the bnr.rw primary text rather than secondary reporting. A related question is whether the infrastructure-only requirement extends, or will be extended, to nonbank payment-system operators beyond RSwitch, since the current record documents its application specifically to RSwitch's eKash wallet discontinuation rather than a sector-wide rule applied against a named list of operators.
1 earlier distinct update(s)
Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access
Rwanda's core statutory basis for payment-system licensing remains Law No. 061/2021, whose Article 50 requires any person operating a payment system or acting as a payment-system service provider to obtain a licence from the National Bank of Rwanda, with criminal sanctions available on conviction for unlicensed operation (wpm-2026-W32-004). This statute continues to function as the primary market-access gate for both bank and non-bank payment-service providers operating in Rwanda, and its criminal-sanction backstop distinguishes it from jurisdictions where unlicensed payment-system operation carries only administrative consequence.
Layered onto this established licensing basis is a newly gazetted second track: Law n023/2026, Rwanda's Virtual Asset Law, designates the Capital Markets Authority as lead regulator for virtual-asset business, while the National Bank of Rwanda retains oversight wherever virtual-asset activity intersects with payment systems, and the law restricts the use of virtual assets as a means of payment absent National Bank of Rwanda authorisation (wpm-2026-W32-005). This creates a dual-regulator market-access framework specific to virtual-asset-linked payment activity: a prospective entrant offering a virtual-asset-based payment product in Rwanda must now clear both the Capital Markets Authority's virtual-asset-business licensing track and, where the product functions as a means of payment, National Bank of Rwanda payment-systems authorisation. This is a materially different market-access posture from a single-regulator payments licensing regime, and it applies specifically to the segment of the market building on virtual-asset rails rather than to payment-system operators generally, who continue to be governed by the established Law No. 061/2021 licensing basis.
Together, the two instruments mean Rwanda's payments market-access framework now has two parallel gates: an established, criminally-backed general payment-systems licence under National Bank of Rwanda authority, and a new, narrower dual-regulator gate for virtual-asset-linked payment activity. Both bank and non-bank entrants intersect with the general gate; only virtual-asset-linked entrants intersect with the new dual-regulator gate.
Outlook
Watch for the Capital Markets Authority's secondary regulations further specifying the virtual-asset business licensing process, and for any early licensing decisions under the new Law n023/2026 framework that would clarify how the dual National Bank of Rwanda / Capital Markets Authority gate operates in practice for payment-linked virtual-asset products.
Sources and findings (5)
- T2https://digitalpolicyalert.org/event/26396 (Regulation No. 74/2023 Governing Payment Services Providers)
- T1https://digitalpolicyalert.org/event/26394 (Law No. 61/2021 Governing the Payment System)
- T3https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=56b12aa2-1a25-427f-a6a3-1ff31189f07b
- T1https://www.bnr.rw/documents/Licensing_requirements_for_PSPs_3.pdf
- T3https://rw.andersen.com/dist/rwanda-fintech-hub.html