Turkey Payments & Fintech Regulation

TR schema world-payments-v1 trajectory: not yet assessed

Last updated · 14 modules · 108 sourced findings · 90 sources in the cumulative register

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 25 October 2026

Lead Signal

The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) cancelled the e-money institution operating licence of Parakolay Elektronik Para A.Ş., a decision published in the Official Gazette on 10 October 2026. Within the same window, the CBRT also granted a new e-money institution operating licence to NXT Elektronik Para ve Ödeme Hizmetleri A.Ş., published in the Official Gazette (Sayı 33389) on 3 October 2026, one day before this window's anchor date and treated as borderline context rather than a confirmed in-window delta in its own right. Both actions proceed under Law No. 6493, which restricts the provision of payment services to banks, e-money institutions, payment institutions and PTT (the Turkish Post), and restricts e-money issuance specifically to banks, PTT and licensed e-money institutions. Taken together, the cancellation and the grant read as routine churn within an actively supervised e-money licence pool rather than any shift in the governing framework itself; no amendment to Law No. 6493 was identified.

Key regulatory facts for Turkey
Regulatory DimensionTurkey Standing Position
JurisdictionTurkey (TR)
Regulatory ScopePayments & Fintech Regulation (14 modules, 108 sourced findings)
Licensing, Authorisation & Market AccessNon-bank market access via PI and EMI licences under Law No.
Conduct, Safeguarding & PromotionsSafeguarding under Law No.
Stablecoins & Digital MoneyCrypto-as-payment banned since Apr 2021; CASPs regulated under Law No.
Operational Resilience & Critical InfraOperational resilience for Turkish payments draws on the CBRT's information-systems communiqué for PIs/EMIs and the BDDK's 2020 banking IT regulation (Regulation on Banks' Information Systems and Electronic Banking...
Primary Instruments CitedTurkey Official Instrument (tcmb.gov.tr Payment-Services), Turkey Official Instrument (chambers.com providing-payment-e-money-servic), Turkey Official Instrument (faisalkhan.com turkey-electronic-money-e-money-), Turkey Official Instrument (multilaw.com Section_Home-aspx-GuideId-2-Guid), Turkey Official Instrument (nortonrosefulbright.com doing-business-in-turkey-fintech)
Last Confirmed / Updated2026-11-04 (90 sources in cumulative register)

#

Non-bank market access via PI and EMI licences under Law No. 6493 (2013); CBRT competent authority since 1 Jan 2020 (operational licensing from 18 Jan 2021); ~86 licensed PI/EMIs in 2024.

Key judgment — Probable · impact CBRT's licence cancellation of Parakolay alongside a new grant to NXT indicates routine active-supervision churn in Turkey's e-money licence pool rather than a change in the governing Law No. 6493 framework.claims: none recorded
Open gap — wpm-int-1TCMB press-release archive for the 18-25 Oct 2026 window was not exhaustively checked; only an earlier announcement (29 July 2026) was located.Emerging-market rails are a known under-indexed vector per BIAS CORRECTIONS.
Standing sub-brief · as of 23 August 2026 415 words · last cycle 2026-10-25

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Turkiye's payments and e-money licensing regime came under direct and material enforcement stress this cycle. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkiye (CBRT) revoked Papara Elektronik Para A.S.'s e-money institution licence on 31 October 2025, acting under Law No. 6493 Articles 16 and 19 following a MASAK investigation into illegal-betting-related money laundering. Lexology Pro reporting characterises this as the fourth Turkish fintech e-money or payment-licence revocation over illegal-betting allegations within the same year, a high-confidence indicator that Turkish authorities are treating licensing enforcement as a primary lever against illegal-betting-related financial flows moving through the non-bank payment sector specifically.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-25

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The CBRT cancelled the e-money institution operating licence of Parakolay Elektronik Para A.Ş., with the decision published in the Official Gazette on 10 October 2026. This cancellation sits alongside the CBRT's grant of a new e-money institution operating licence to NXT Elektronik Para ve Ödeme Hizmetleri A.Ş., published in the Official Gazette (Sayı 33389) on 3 October 2026, a day before the window's anchor date and treated here as context for the licence-pool picture rather than as its own confirmed in-window delta.

Both actions operate under Law No. 6493, Turkey's payment-services and e-money framework, which restricts the provision of payment services to banks, e-money institutions, payment institutions and PTT (the Turkish Post), and restricts e-money issuance specifically to banks, PTT and licensed e-money institutions. The licensing authority for both the cancellation and the grant is the CBRT, consistent with its role as prudential supervisor of the non-bank payment-institution and e-money-institution sector under that law.

Read together, a cancellation and a grant within the same narrow window indicate the CBRT continuing to actively manage its licence pool rather than any relaxation or tightening of entry standards generally; nothing in the evidence reaching points to a change in Law No. 6493 itself, only to individual licensing decisions made under its existing terms. The cancellation in particular reflects CBRT's willingness to remove institutions from the licensed pool, a supervisory action with direct consequence for the institution concerned and, by extension, for any merchants or customers relying on that institution's e-money services at the time of cancellation.

Sourcing for the Parakolay cancellation rests on the CBRT's own regulatory-decision index as a single anchor; no independent second source corroborating that specific cancellation was located, which the gaps register flags explicitly as a module-source-floor shortfall for this finding.

Outlook

What would materially change the picture here is either independent corroboration of the Parakolay cancellation from a source beyond the CBRT's own index, or a subsequent licensing action that would indicate whether this round of churn reflects anything beyond ordinary supervisory turnover in the e-money institution pool.

2 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The CBRT cancelled the e-money institution operating licence of Parakolay Elektronik Para A.Ş., with the decision published in the Official Gazette on 10 October 2026. This cancellation sits alongside the CBRT's grant of a new e-money institution operating licence to NXT Elektronik Para ve Ödeme Hizmetleri A.Ş., published in the Official Gazette (Sayı 33389) on 3 October 2026, a day before the window's anchor date and treated here as context for the licence-pool picture rather than as its own confirmed in-window delta.

Both actions operate under Law No. 6493, Turkey's payment-services and e-money framework, which restricts the provision of payment services to banks, e-money institutions, payment institutions and PTT (the Turkish Post), and restricts e-money issuance specifically to banks, PTT and licensed e-money institutions. The licensing authority for both the cancellation and the grant is the CBRT, consistent with its role as prudential supervisor of the non-bank payment-institution and e-money-institution sector under that law.

Read together, a cancellation and a grant within the same narrow window indicate the CBRT continuing to actively manage its licence pool rather than any relaxation or tightening of entry standards generally; nothing in the evidence reaching this cycle points to a change in Law No. 6493 itself, only to individual licensing decisions made under its existing terms. The cancellation in particular reflects CBRT's willingness to remove institutions from the licensed pool, a supervisory action with direct consequence for the institution concerned and, by extension, for any merchants or customers relying on that institution's e-money services at the time of cancellation.

Sourcing for the Parakolay cancellation rests on the CBRT's own regulatory-decision index as a single anchor; no independent second source corroborating that specific cancellation was located this cycle, which the gaps register flags explicitly as a module-source-floor shortfall for this finding.

Outlook

What would materially change the picture here is either independent corroboration of the Parakolay cancellation from a source beyond the CBRT's own index, or a subsequent licensing action that would indicate whether this round of churn reflects anything beyond ordinary supervisory turnover in the e-money institution pool.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-29

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Presidential Decision No. 2026/44 refreshed the composition of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency's Board this cycle, a governance-level development providing the institutional backdrop against which market-access decisions are being made. Against that backdrop, the BRSA approved a Migros subsidiary as a banking-as-a-service interface provider for Colendi Bank, extending the pattern of non-bank retail brands acting as customer-facing interfaces for licensed banking products. This does not represent a widening of the underlying licensing perimeter itself, since Colendi Bank remains the licensed entity and the Migros subsidiary operates as an interface provider rather than a bank or e-money institution in its own right. The distinction between bank/PSP licensure and non-bank interface provision remains the analytically load-bearing feature of this market-access development: the regulated activity continues to sit with the licensed bank, while market reach is extended through commercial partnership rather than through any new licence class.

Outlook

Watch for further BaaS interface approvals under this same structural pattern, and for whether the refreshed BRSA Board composition produces any near-term shift in licensing or supervisory posture beyond the governance change itself.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and findings (16)
  1. T1https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Core+Functions/Payment+Servicesretrieved
  2. T3https://chambers.com/articles/providing-payment-e-money-services-in-turkiye-how-to-obtain-a-licenseretrieved
  3. T3https://faisalkhan.com/solutions/licensing/turkey-electronic-money-e-money-license/retrieved
  4. T3https://multilaw.com/Multilaw/ZENTSO/BusinessGuides/Presentation/Section_Home.aspx?GuideId=2&GuideCountry=Turkey&GuideSection=742retrieved
  5. T3https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/0343df19/doing-business-in-turkey-fintechretrieved
  6. T1TCMB (CBRT) — TCMB (CBRT) — TCMB Tebliğ (Official Gazette No. 33360, 4 September 2026) mandates NFC-based remote identity verification as primary method with OCR/card-reader fallback, permitting biometric data and ICAO 9303 NFC-chip passports for foreign nationals; anonymous prepaid instruments and sub-threshold one-off transactions are exempted.retrieved
  7. T3Papara Elektronik Para A.S. — Papara Elektronik Para A.S. — CBRT revoked Papara's Law 6493 e-money licence on 31 Oct 2025 under Arts 16/19 following a MASAK illegal-betting money-laundering probe; an Ankara administrative court stayed the revocation in Dec 2025 and CBRT reinstated the licence under TMSF trusteeship in Jan 2026retrieved
  8. T3Papara Elektronik Para A.S. — Papara Elektronik Para A.S. — Lexology Pro reporting characterised the Papara action as the fourth Turkish fintech e-money/payment licence revocation over illegal-betting allegations within the yearretrieved
  9. T3BDDK — BDDK Board composition changed under Presidential Decision No. 2026/44 (6 Feb 2026 Official Gazette), appointing Yakup Asarkaya as Second Chairman under Chairman Sahap Kavciogluretrieved
  10. T1Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (CBRT/TCMB) — Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (CBRT/TCMB) — Payment institutions and electronic money institutions under Law No. 6493 (2013) and supporting secondary regulation; non-bank market access via PI and EMI licence categories.
  11. T3BRSA/BDDK to CBRT supervisory transfer — BRSA/BDDK to CBRT supervisory transfer — Regulatory and supervisory authority over payment/e-money institutions moved from BRSA/BDDK to CBRT effective 1 January 2020 (Law No. 7192, enacted Nov 2019); operational licensing under the new CBRT regulation commenced from 18 January 2021.
  12. T1Parakolay Elektronik Para A.Ş. — CBRT cancelled the e-money institution operating licence of Parakolay Elektronik Para A.Ş., published in the Official Gazette on 10 October 2026.retrieved
  13. T1NXT Elektronik Para ve Ödeme Hizmetleri A.Ş. — CBRT granted a new e-money institution operating licence to NXT Elektronik Para ve Ödeme Hizmetleri A.Ş., published in the Official Gazette (Sayı 33389) on 3 October 2026.retrieved
  14. T3TCMB (Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye) — TCMB (Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye) — TCMB's implementing Payment Services and Electronic Money Issuance Regulation restricts payment services to TCMB itself, Banking-Law-licensed banks, TCMB-licensed institutions incorporated in Turkey, and PTT.retrieved
  15. T3CBRT cross-border fintech cooperation arrangements — CBRT cross-border fintech cooperation arrangements — Four cross-border fintech cooperation arrangements published on the CBRT website as of October 2026 (Lidio with Global Collect Services B.V. and dLocal Limited; Moka United with TransferGo Lithuania UAB and Wise Payments Ltd) permit foreign payment firms to cooperate with Turkish-licensed entities without a Turkish operating permit, subject to no direct Turkish-market branding/targeting.retrieved
  16. T3Law No. 6493 Art. 4(2) — Law No. 6493 Art. 4(2) — Only TCMB, Turkish banks, TCMB-licensed Turkey-incorporated institutions, and PTT may provide payment services.retrieved

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Safeguarding under Law No. 6493 requires e-money issuers to convert received funds into e-money without delay and to hold customer funds in segregated, blocked bank accounts at Law No. 5411 banks during the term of use, separate from the institution's own assets. PIs/EMIs must additionally deposit minimum security amounts with the CBRT (tiered by activity). Institutions are activity-restricted to permitted payment/e-money services. Conduct is governed by framework agreements with users, KVKK data-protection obligations, mandatory data localisation within Türkiye, and MASAK AML reporting. The CBRT supervises, audits, and can suspend or revoke licences.

Horizon · 2026-Q1 (± a quarter)Annual CBRT minimum-capital / security-deposit re-determinationAdopted, not yet in force · Tier 3 source
Horizon · 2026-Q1 (± a quarter)Annual CBRT minimum-capital / security-deposit re-determinationAdopted, not yet in force · Tier 3 source
Horizon · 2026-09-04 (± a quarter)Remote-identification amendment for payment/e-money institutions in forceIn force · Tier 1 source
Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 239 words · last cycle 2026-10-04

Conduct, Safeguarding & Promotions

Türkiye's safeguarding regime for non-bank EMIs rests on bank-held blocked segregation. E-money issuers must transfer funds received for e-money issuance into a separate bank account at Law No. 5411 banks, with the holding bank blocking those amounts during the term of use, thereby segregating customer funds from institution assets. This is a segregation mechanism rather than an insurance or trust structure, and it shapes EMI cost and liquidity profiles accordingly.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-29

Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

An amended regulation on remote-customer-onboarding identity-verification methods for payment and electronic-money institutions was published in Official Gazette No. 33360 on 4 September 2026, and entered into force on that date. The amendment revises the identity-verification methods available to payment service providers for remote customer onboarding, tightening the conduct standard applied at the point of customer acquisition. This sits alongside MASAK's enhanced transaction-purpose disclosure regime for large transfers, effective 1 January 2026, which layers an additional conduct-adjacent control onto the payment-rail environment by requiring banks to document transfer origin and purpose for transfers of TRY200,000 or more. Together, these two developments mark a tightening trajectory on the conduct and safeguarding axis for Turkish payment and e-money institutions this cycle, running in parallel with, rather than in tension with, the market-access liberalisation visible in the BaaS partnership activity tracked elsewhere this cycle.

Outlook

Watch for practitioner or industry commentary on how the Gazette 33360 remote-identification amendment affects onboarding friction or fraud rates in practice, and for whether MASAK's disclosure threshold is revisited or extended to lower transfer amounts.

Sources and findings (8)
  1. T3https://www.admdlaw.com/payment-security-settlement-systems-and-e-money-insutitions-in-turkey/retrieved
  2. T2https://cms.law/en/tur/legal-updates/turkey-s-central-bank-adopts-new-secondary-legislation-on-payment-services-and-e-moneyretrieved
  3. T3https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/fintech-laws-and-regulations/turkey/retrieved
  4. T3https://www.bicakhukuk.com/en/sanctions-liabilities-in-turkeys-electronic-payment-law/retrieved
  5. T1BDDK / Regulation on Payment Services and Electronic Money Issuance — BDDK / Regulation on Payment Services and Electronic Money Issuance — Revises remote-customer-onboarding identity-verification methods available to payment service providers.retrieved
  6. T3Law No. 6493 e-money safeguarding regime — Law No. 6493 e-money safeguarding regime — E-money issuers must transfer funds received for e-money issuance into a separate bank account at Law No. 5411 banks, with the holding bank blocking those amounts during the term of use, segregating customer funds from institution assets.
  7. T2CBRT minimum security deposit thresholds — CBRT minimum security deposit thresholds — Bill-payment-intermediation PIs TRY 2m, other PIs TRY 3m, EMIs TRY 5m deposited with CBRT (historical thresholds); CBRT determines amounts annually and significantly higher figures (e.g. TRY 15m for bill-payment-only) entered force 30 June 2025.
  8. T3TCMB Payment Services and Electronic Money Issuance Regulation, Arts 35 and 36/A — TCMB Payment Services and Electronic Money Issuance Regulation, Arts 35 and 36/A — Customer funds collected against e-money must be transferred to a segregated account at a bank; funds may not be used as collateral and safeguarding balances may only be invested in low-risk liquid assets under a 2026 amendment.retrieved

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Crypto-as-payment banned since Apr 2021; CASPs regulated under Law No. 7518 (Jul 2024); no MiCA-equivalent stablecoin category; Digital TL CBDC pilot phase one complete.

Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 249 words · last cycle 2026-06-27

Stablecoins & Digital Money

Türkiye has no dedicated stablecoin category equivalent to MiCA EMTs; stablecoins currently fall under CML/CMB crypto-asset rules established by Law No. 7518. Industry commentary anticipates that stablecoin payment-rail issuance may migrate to CBRT payment-services law in future, but no official roadmap is published, and that forward-migration assertion rests on single-source commentary rather than confirmed policy.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (9)
  1. T3https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/blockchain-2025/turkey/trends-and-developmentsretrieved
  2. T3https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-cryptocurrency-laws-and-regulations/turkey-turkiye/retrieved
  3. T3https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/fintech-laws-and-regulations/turkey/retrieved
  4. T3https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/blockchain-2025/turkey/trends-and-developmentsretrieved
  5. T3https://www.lightspark.com/knowledge/is-crypto-legal-in-turkeyretrieved
  6. T3Türkiye stablecoin classification — Türkiye stablecoin classification — No dedicated stablecoin category equivalent to MiCA EMTs; stablecoins currently fall under CML/CMB crypto-asset rules (Law No. 7518). Industry commentary anticipates stablecoin payment-rail issuance may migrate to CBRT payment-services law in future, but no official roadmap is published.
  7. T3Law No. 7518 (Capital Markets Law amendment) — Law No. 7518 (Capital Markets Law amendment) — Published in Official Gazette No. 32590 on 2 July 2024, establishing Türkiye's first crypto-asset legal framework, authorising the CMB/SPK to license and supervise CASPs, with TÜBİTAK supplying technical standards and MASAK enforcing AML.
  8. T3CBRT crypto-payment prohibition — CBRT crypto-payment prohibition — The CBRT Regulation on the Disuse of Crypto Assets in Payments (published 16 April 2021, in force 30 April 2021) prohibits direct/indirect use of crypto assets in payments and bars PIs/EMIs from intermediating crypto trading platforms.
  9. T3Digital Turkish Lira CBDC pilot — Digital Turkish Lira CBDC pilot — CBRT completed phase one of the Digital Turkish Lira pilot in February 2024, confirming a two-tier programmable payment model with bank-supplied wallets, testing offline resilience and cross-border interoperability, aligning R&D with BIS standards.

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Operational resilience for Turkish payments draws on the CBRT's information-systems communiqué for PIs/EMIs and the BDDK's 2020 banking IT regulation (Regulation on Banks' Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services). Institutions must run annual information-systems risk assessments, submit reports to the CBRT by end-January, notify the KVKK board and customers of cyber incidents, and use independent auditors for IT systems. Türkiye mandates strict authentication (universal 2FA, an SMS-OTP ban for mobile banking), data localisation, and real-time incident reporting; cybersecurity oversight is shared among BDDK, CBRT and a Cybersecurity Authority empowered under Law No. 7545 (2025). Core RTGS/instant-payment infrastructure is CBRT-developed and self-assessed against BIS-IOSCO PFMI.

Kept on Dataprotection.gi, not restated here: data and cloud switching obligations on service providers, including notice periods and charges. Open its jurisdiction pages on Dataprotection.gi →

Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 171 words · last cycle 2026-06-27

Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure

Türkiye operates among the strictest authentication regimes globally. Universal two-factor authentication is mandated and SMS-OTP is banned for mobile banking under the BDDK 2020 Regulation on Banks' Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services, with real-time incident reporting, data localisation, ISO 27001 and PCI DSS compliance required, and an annual IS risk assessment reported to the CBRT by end-January. The SMS-OTP ban forces PSPs — banks and non-banks alike — to adopt phishing-resistant authentication, raising onboarding and infrastructure costs.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (6)
  1. T2https://cms.law/en/tur/legal-updates/turkey-s-central-bank-adopts-new-secondary-legislation-on-payment-services-and-e-moneyretrieved
  2. T3https://www.corbado.com/blog/turkey-financial-regulations-authenticationretrieved
  3. T3https://www.corbado.com/blog/turkey-financial-regulations-authenticationretrieved
  4. T1https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Core+Functions/Payment+Systems/Payment+Systems+in+Turkey/Electronic+Fund+Transfer+System+and+Electronic+Securities+Transfer+Systemretrieved
  5. T3Türkiye payments cyber-resilience regime — Türkiye payments cyber-resilience regime — Universal two-factor authentication mandated, SMS-OTP banned for mobile banking under the BDDK 2020 Regulation on Banks' Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services; real-time incident reporting, data localisation, ISO 27001 and PCI DSS compliance required; annual IS risk assessment reported to CBRT by end-January.
  6. T3Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate (Law No. 7545) — Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate (Law No. 7545) — Cybersecurity oversight coordinated across BDDK (banking), CBRT (payment systems) and a Cybersecurity Directorate whose powers were significantly expanded under Law No. 7545 enacted in March 2025.

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Card-scheme infrastructure runs through the Interbank Card Center (BKM), a non-profit jointly owned by the CBRT (controlling stake since April 2020) and banks, which operates the domestic card authorisation/clearing switch, the local 3DS ACS, the BKM Express wallet and the domestic Troy card scheme. Visa and Mastercard dominate alongside Troy (~25M cards in 2026, with Discover/Diners reciprocal acceptance abroad). PCI DSS and 3D Secure 2.2 are enforced; the TR QR Code (TR Karekod) is the national QR standard. Card clearing settles on a deferred net basis (e.g. T+2 via Gosas for member banks). PSPs must share payment infrastructure with other PSPs on request under Article 8 of the Payment Services Regulation.

Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 251 words · last cycle 2026-06-27

Scheme & Network Compliance

The Interbank Card Center (BKM) operates the domestic card authorisation and clearing switch, the local 3DS ACS, the BKM Express wallet and the Troy domestic scheme, with the CBRT having acquired a controlling interest in BKM in 2020; Gosas clears card transactions on deferred net settlement at T+2. The exact 30 April 2020 date for the controlling-stake acquisition is not corroborated by primary sources, so year-only framing is adopted. CBRT control of BKM gives the central bank direct leverage over domestic card switching, the Troy scheme and 3DS infrastructure.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (8)
  1. T3https://cundoglu.medium.com/real-time-payments-in-turkey-9aea211e98cdretrieved
  2. T3https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/competition-blog/a-primer-on-payment-services-in-turkiye-competition-cooperation-and-confrontation/retrieved
  3. T3https://www.zunapro.com/turkey/en/blog/payment-systems-ecommerce-turkeyretrieved
  4. T3https://cashmanagement.bnpparibas.com/atlas-countries/turkeyretrieved
  5. T3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troy_(card_scheme)retrieved
  6. T3Interbank Card Center (BKM) — Interbank Card Center (BKM) — BKM operates the domestic card authorisation/clearing switch, local 3DS ACS, BKM Express wallet and the Troy domestic scheme; CBRT acquired a controlling interest in BKM in 2020. Gosas clears card transactions on deferred net settlement at T+2.
  7. T3Troy domestic card scheme — Troy domestic card scheme — Troy reached approximately 67 million cards as of August 2025, capturing a ~20% share of card transactions (research-stated figure of ~25M cards in 2026 is materially understated/stale). Offers credit, debit, prepaid issuing; accepted on the US Discover network since 2017.
  8. T3Article 8 CBRT Payment Services Regulation — Article 8 CBRT Payment Services Regulation — Article 8 obliges all PSPs (banks, PIs, EMIs) to make their payment account services and payment infrastructure available to other PSPs on request, with a decision required within one month.

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Domestic rails centre on the CBRT-owned FAST instant-payment system (launched January 2021, 24/7, sub-second settlement in central-bank money) with BKM-run overlay services (KOLAS easy-addressing, TR QR Code), plus the EFT (BPS/RPS) and ESTS RTGS systems. Cross-border settlement flows through correspondent banking and Visa/Mastercard rails; FAST currently operates within national boundaries with cross-border interoperability under exploration. Türkiye is a large remittance and e-export corridor; PayU/iyzico explicitly position Türkiye as a bridge between CEE and Africa for local-currency cross-border trade. International digital wallets (PayPal, Apple Pay, Google Pay) are not permitted to operate domestically.

Open gap — wpm-int-2No TR-specific instant-payments-rail (FAST) amendment was located this cycle.no under-indexing note recorded
Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 149 words · last cycle 2026-06-27

Payment Corridor Dynamics

The central plank of the corridor view is FAST, the CBRT-developed and owned instant-payment system, which launched a pilot on 18 December 2020 and opened to all customers on 8 January 2021. FAST executes 24/7 sub-second payments in central-bank money, with overlay services — KOLAS easy-addressing and the TR QR Code — commissioned to BKM, and direct participation open to banks and non-bank PSPs with no joining or annual fee. Fee-free non-bank participation in a 24/7 central-bank instant rail is a strong driver of account-to-account payment growth and a competitive threat to card volumes.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T1https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Core+Functions/Payment+Systems/Payment+Systems+in+Turkey/Electronic+Fund+Transfer+System+and+Electronic+Securities+Transfer+Systemretrieved
  2. T1https://fastpayments.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2023-05/World%20Bank_FPS_FAST%20Turkey_Final.pdf Applies beyond this jurisdiction (World Bank)retrieved
  3. T3https://cashmanagement.bnpparibas.com/atlas-countries/turkeyretrieved
  4. T3https://www.amadeuscapital.com/global-fintech-giant-payu-acquires-turkeys-leading-fintech-company-iyzico-in-a-165-million-investment/retrieved
  5. T1FAST instant-payment system — FAST instant-payment system — CBRT-developed/owned FAST launched pilot 18 Dec 2020 and to all customers 8 Jan 2021, executing 24/7 sub-second payments in central-bank money; overlay services (KOLAS easy-addressing, TR QR Code) commissioned to BKM; direct participation open to banks and non-bank PSPs with no joining/annual fee.

#

Türkiye's payments market is large and fast-growing — 110M+ active cards and ~86 licensed payment/e-money institutions in 2024, with combined PI/EMI transaction volume around TRY 5 trillion (vs ~TRY 120 trillion for banks). The structure blends bank-owned utilities (BKM, Troy) with a deep fintech layer: major acquirers/PSPs include PayTR, iyzico (Prosus/PayU-owned), Param, Stripe Turkey, and marketplace wallets (Trendyol Cüzdan, HepsiPay). Neobank/embedded-finance players Papara (a unicorn) and ColendiBank (BDDK-licensed 2024) are scaling. Fintech led Turkish startup investment in 2025 with a record ~$219.7M raised, and Sipay (valuation ~$875M) bills itself as Türkiye's largest fintech.

Standing sub-brief · as of 23 August 2026 271 words · last cycle 2026-08-21

Industry Structure & Commercial Dynamics

Turkiye's payments market structure showed continued bank-fintech integration this cycle alongside an unconfirmed foreign-entry signal. Aktif Bank's subsidiary Aktif Ventures launched Apilion, a banking-as-a-service API marketplace giving fintechs access to core banking, investment, payments and insurance infrastructure through a single integration layer. This is a low-confidence, single-sourced development, but it is consistent with broader commentary characterising the Turkish fintech sector as one that grows in partnership with incumbent banks rather than through disintermediated competition.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T3https://www.zunapro.com/turkey/en/blog/payment-systems-ecommerce-turkeyretrieved
  2. T3https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/0343df19/doing-business-in-turkey-fintechretrieved
  3. T3https://fintechmagazine.com/fintech/why-is-fintech-dominating-the-turkish-start-up-ecosystemretrieved
  4. T3https://fintechnews.ae/29780/turkey/turkeys-leading-fintech-startups/retrieved
  5. T3Türkiye payments market structure — Türkiye payments market structure — ~86 licensed PI/EMIs plus 6 digital banks in 2024, combined PI/EMI volume ~TRY 5tn vs banks' ~TRY 120tn; 110M+ active cards. Key acquirers/PSPs: PayTR, iyzico (Prosus/PayU), Param, Stripe Türkiye; marketplace wallets (Trendyol Cüzdan, HepsiPay); neobanks Papara (unicorn) and ColendiBank.

2025 AML/financial-crime crackdown on payment companies ahead of FATF on-site; Law No. 6493 Arts 27-40 enforcement framework; Competition Board PF/bank acquiring disputes.

Standing sub-brief · as of 23 August 2026 248 words · last cycle 2026-08-21

Legal & Litigation

Turkiye's payments-sector litigation landscape this cycle is defined by a single but structurally significant event: Ankara's 25th Administrative Court ruled to stay execution of CBRT's decision cancelling Papara's e-money licence, allowing the company to resume operations pending appeal. This establishes, for the first time in this evidence base, that judicial review can meaningfully constrain a Central Bank enforcement action in the Turkish payments sector pending appeal, rather than such enforcement actions taking immediate and unreviewable effect.

No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.

Sources and findings (6)
  1. T3https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/fatf-inspection-behind-turkeys-wave-of-money-laundering-raids-sources-say-25187/retrieved
  2. T3https://www.bicakhukuk.com/en/sanctions-liabilities-in-turkeys-electronic-payment-law/retrieved
  3. T3https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/competition-blog/a-primer-on-payment-services-in-turkiye-competition-cooperation-and-confrontation/retrieved
  4. T3https://www.legal500.com/developments/thought-leadership/the-legal-regime-of-crypto-assets-in-turkey-and-the-role-of-regulatory-institutions/retrieved
  5. T3Ankara 25th Administrative Court — Ankara 25th Administrative Court — Ankara's 25th Administrative Court ruled to stay execution of CBRT's Papara licence cancellation, allowing resumption of operations pending appealretrieved
  6. T3Türkiye 2025 AML enforcement crackdown on payment companies — Türkiye 2025 AML enforcement crackdown on payment companies — 2025 surge of money-laundering raids targeting payment companies/fintechs linked to an upcoming FATF on-site inspection; dozens of payment companies had licences suspended, executives detained, and several holdings transferred to the state TMSF, with investigations focused on shareholder/ownership due-diligence failures during licensing.

#

Merchant acquiring is conducted by banks and CBRT-licensed payment facilitators/PIs; the Turkish Competition Board treats PFs and banks as competitors in this market while PFs depend on banks' POS access. Dispute/chargeback handling is centralised through BKM, which operates a standardised central chargeback system, and consumer-favourable rules (aligned with EU standards) place the burden of proving transaction authenticity on merchants. 3D Secure 2.2 and a deep installment (taksit) culture shape acquiring economics. iyzico (Prosus/PayU), PayTR, Param and Stripe Turkey are leading acquirers; iyzico cites buyer-protection services securing over 4 million consumer transactions.

Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 138 words · last cycle 2026-06-27

Merchant Acquiring & Risk

The acquiring module turns on an unresolved competition tension. The Turkish Competition Board treats payment facilitators and banks as competitors in the merchant-acquiring market while their POS-access relationship is also vertical, raising unresolved margin-squeeze concerns where no bank holds a dominant position. This horizontal-and-vertical relationship between payment facilitators and banks creates structural margin-squeeze risk shaping acquirer economics. Dispute and chargeback handling is centralised through BKM, with the merchant authenticity burden placed on the acquiring side.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T3https://stripe.com/resources/more/payments-in-turkeyretrieved
  2. T3https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/competition-blog/a-primer-on-payment-services-in-turkiye-competition-cooperation-and-confrontation/retrieved
  3. T3https://startupintros.com/orgs/iyzicoretrieved
  4. T3https://www.zunapro.com/turkey/en/blog/payment-systems-ecommerce-turkeyretrieved
  5. T3Turkish Competition Board merchant-acquiring treatment — Turkish Competition Board merchant-acquiring treatment — The Turkish Competition Board treats payment facilitators and banks as competitors in the merchant-acquiring market while their POS-access relationship is also vertical, raising unresolved margin-squeeze concerns where no bank holds a dominant position.

#

Open banking is being built out through BKM's GATE infrastructure under CBRT authority, with Payment Initiation and Account Information Services (the ÖHVPS/DSSP framework) defined under Article 12 of Law No. 6493; certification (HHS/YÖS) deadlines were rescaled to a December 2025 ÖHVPS 2.0 transition, and the March 2025 amendment narrowed the connection obligation. Digital wallets were brought into the licensing perimeter (compliance deadline extended to 31 December 2025), with interoperable card-on-file treated as wallet/open-banking services. The CBRT runs the Digital Turkish Lira CBDC pilot, and instant-rail/QR products (FAST, TR Karekod, KOLAS) plus BNPL (Colendi, Garanti Pay) are expanding.

Horizon · 2025-12 (± a quarter)ÖHVPS 2.0 open-banking certification + production go-live deadlineAdopted, not yet in force · Tier 3 source
Horizon · 2025-12 (± a quarter)Digital-wallet provider CBRT licensing compliance deadlineAdopted, not yet in force · Tier 3 source
Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 156 words · last cycle 2026-10-04

Product Innovation & Market Development

Open banking is built through BKM's GATE infrastructure under CBRT authority, with payment initiation services and account information services defined under Article 12 of Law No. 6493. Institutions with a transition obligation must complete ÖHVPS 2.0 certification and go into production by 31 December 2025, while a March 2025 amendment narrowed the connection obligation. The digital-wallet compliance deadline was likewise extended to 31 December 2025. Together these deadlines bring TPPs and wallet providers fully into the CBRT perimeter, reshaping product-access economics for both banks and non-banks.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-29

Product Innovation & Market Development

Two banking-as-a-service partnerships mark this cycle's product-innovation signal for Türkiye: GetirFinans's partnership with Fibabanka, and the BRSA's approval of a Migros subsidiary as a BaaS interface provider for Colendi Bank. Both extend consumer access to regulated banking products through non-bank retail and delivery-platform interfaces rather than through the licensed bank's own direct channels. This is a product-development pattern rather than a licensing-perimeter change: the bank (Fibabanka, Colendi Bank) remains the regulated entity of record, while the retail brand (GetirFinans, Migros) provides the consumer-facing surface. The commercial logic is straightforward market-access expansion via existing large consumer bases, and it is occurring in parallel with, not instead of, the conduct-tightening measures visible in the remote-onboarding and transfer-disclosure developments tracked elsewhere this cycle.

Outlook

Watch for additional BaaS interface launches following this pattern, and for whether any of the participating banks report material customer-acquisition or transaction-volume impact attributable specifically to the BaaS channel.

Sources and findings (8)
  1. T2https://bkm.com.tr/en/products-and-services/data-sharing-services-in-the-field-of-payment/retrieved
  2. T3https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/fintech-laws-and-regulations/turkey/retrieved
  3. T3https://architecht.com/en/corporate/blog/technology/open-banking-and-its-current-situation-in-turkiye/retrieved
  4. T3https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/blockchain-2025/turkey/trends-and-developmentsretrieved
  5. T2CBRT (FAST instant-payment rail) — CBRT (FAST instant-payment rail) — FAST per-transaction ceiling raised to TRY 300,000 for P2P, Request-to-Pay, and FAST-TR QR merchant payments, effective 26 August 2026; FAST Secure Payment channel for notarised vehicle sales carries a separate TRY 5,000,000 ceiling.retrieved
  6. T2BRSA / Migros / Colendi Bank — BRSA / Migros / Colendi Bank — BRSA approved Migros subsidiary Money Finansal Teknoloji Hizmetleri A.Ş. as a banking-as-a-service interface provider for Colendi Bank A.Ş.
  7. T2Türkiye open-banking framework (ÖHVPS / GATE) — Türkiye open-banking framework (ÖHVPS / GATE) — Open banking built through BKM's GATE infrastructure under CBRT authority; PIS and AIS defined under Article 12 of Law No. 6493; institutions with a transition obligation must complete ÖHVPS 2.0 certification and go into production by 31 December 2025; March 2025 amendment narrowed the connection obligation. Digital-wallet compliance deadline extended to 31 December 2025.
  8. T3BDDK Decision 11581/11582 — BDDK Decision 11581/11582 — Credit-card minimum-payment threshold raised to TRY 100,000; phone-loan maturity limits changed.

#

Consumer protection rests on Türkiye's Consumer Protection Law (consumer-favourable, broadly EU-aligned) plus the CBRT payment-services conduct rules and KVKK data protection. Card-dispute/chargeback handling is centralised through BKM, with merchants bearing the authenticity burden. Türkiye has no dedicated UK-style mandatory APP-fraud reimbursement scheme; instead fraud control operates at system level — the CBRT mandates fraud controls through FAST instructions and the Security Overlay Service (SIPER) for risk-data sharing, plus a centralised Merchant Registration System and transaction monitoring. Universal 2FA and the SMS-OTP ban harden consumer authentication.

Horizon · 2026-01-01 (± a quarter)MASAK large-transfer disclosure rule effectiveIn force · Tier 3 source
Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 116 words · last cycle 2026-10-04

Consumer Protection & APP Fraud

Türkiye has no dedicated UK-style mandatory APP-fraud reimbursement scheme. Fraud control instead operates at system level, via CBRT FAST instructions, the Security Overlay Service (SIPER) for risk-data sharing, a centralised Merchant Registration System and transaction monitoring, with BKM operating centralised chargebacks under a merchant authenticity burden, and universal 2FA and the SMS-OTP ban hardening authentication. The reliance on system-level controls rather than a reimbursement mandate shifts liability allocation away from a UK-style PSP reimbursement model.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-29

Consumer Protection & APP Fraud

MASAK's enhanced transaction-purpose disclosure regime for transfers of TRY200,000 or more, effective 1 January 2026, layers a consumer-facing conduct control directly onto ordinary bank-transfer rails. Banks must now document the origin and purpose of qualifying transfers, which functions as a friction point at the point of transaction rather than a purely back-office reporting requirement. While this rule was introduced as part of a wider enforcement campaign against illegal-gambling payment flows, a matter for the financial-integrity monitor's own domain analysis, its consumer-protection-relevant effect from a payments perspective is the additional disclosure step now required of any customer initiating a qualifying large transfer, regardless of the transfer's underlying purpose. This is a tightening development for the payments conduct environment, adding a documentation requirement at the transaction layer that did not previously exist at this threshold.

Outlook

Watch for any customer-facing friction or complaint volume reported in connection with the TRY200,000 disclosure threshold, and for whether the threshold itself is revised.

Sources and findings (6)
  1. T3https://stripe.com/resources/more/payments-in-turkeyretrieved
  2. T3https://www.lightspark.com/knowledge/instant-payments-turkeyretrieved
  3. T3https://www.corbado.com/blog/turkey-financial-regulations-authenticationretrieved
  4. T3https://stripe.com/resources/more/payments-in-turkeyretrieved
  5. T3MASAK — MASAK — Banks must document origin and stated purpose of funds for transfers of TRY200,000 or more from 1 January 2026.retrieved
  6. T3Türkiye consumer-protection and fraud-control regime — Türkiye consumer-protection and fraud-control regime — No dedicated UK-style mandatory APP-fraud reimbursement scheme; fraud control operates at system level via CBRT FAST instructions, the Security Overlay Service (SIPER) for risk-data sharing, a centralised Merchant Registration System and transaction monitoring; BKM operates centralised chargebacks with merchant authenticity burden; universal 2FA and SMS-OTP ban harden authentication.

#

MASAK FIU; FATF grey-list exit 28 Jun 2024 (R.15 partially compliant); crypto Travel Rule fully in force; late-2025 on-site inspection over residual payments-sector gaps. Sentinel-fed.

Horizon · 2025-H2 (± six months)FATF on-site inspection of Türkiye (post-delisting verification)Consultation · Tier 3 source
Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 178 words · last cycle 2026-06-27

AML/CFT & Financial Crime (Sentinel.gi-fed)

This module is sourced from the Sentinel.gi feed; the World Payments Monitor attributes the intelligence to Sentinel and does not re-analyse illicit finance. Per the Sentinel feed, Türkiye's FIU is MASAK; the country was grey-listed in October 2021 and removed on 28 June 2024 after completing its action plan, with one Recommendation (R.15) assessed partially compliant. CASPs are designated obliged parties, and a crypto Travel Rule (Official Gazette 25 December 2024) applies with a 15,000 TRY threshold. A late-2025 FATF on-site inspection reflects residual payments-sector supervision and enforcement gaps.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (11)
  1. T3https://www.paturkey.com/news/2025/fatf-inspection-behind-turkeys-wave-of-money-laundering-raids-sources-say-25187/retrieved
  2. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) per-JID baseline profile — Turkey (Türkiye) — AML/CFT regime built on Law No. 5549, MASAK as FIU with broad real-time data access, and a 2018 National Risk Assessment. Turkey exited the FATF grey list in June 2024 after enhanced follow-up since its 2019 MER; only Recommendation 15 (virtual assets) remains partially compliant. MASAK is gaining new crypto/bank account-freeze powers; CMB is building a VASP licensing regime.
  3. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-004) — Gap: sourcing-thinness
  4. T1FIM (sentinel.gi) sanctions_change_register (issue FIM-BASE-SANC-002) — Sanctions: OFAC listing
  5. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-003) — Gap: enforcement-absence
  6. T1FIM (sentinel.gi) enforcement_action_register (issue FIM-BASE-ENF-001) — Enforcement: OFAC — Six Turkey-based CNC machine-tool firms and linked individuals (Megasan, SSGCTM, Hidropark, AYTT, Minyon, et al.)
  7. T2FIM (sentinel.gi) sanctions_change_register (issue FIM-BASE-SANC-004) — Sanctions: national divergence
  8. T2FIM (sentinel.gi) enforcement_action_register (issue FIM-BASE-ENF-004) — Enforcement: US DOJ — Türkiye Halk Bankasi AS (Halkbank)
  9. T1FIM (sentinel.gi) enforcement_action_register (issue FIM-BASE-ENF-006) — Enforcement: European Union (Council) — Turkey-based third-country suppliers among 60 entities under tightened export restrictions
  10. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-001) — Gap: regulatory-failure
  11. T1MASAK / FATF status (Sentinel-fed) — MASAK / FATF status (Sentinel-fed) — Türkiye's FIU is MASAK; grey-listed Oct 2021 and removed 28 June 2024 after completing its action plan, with one Recommendation (R.15) partially compliant. CASPs designated obliged parties; crypto Travel Rule (Official Gazette 25 Dec 2024) with 15,000 TRY threshold. A late-2025 FATF on-site inspection reflects residual payments-sector supervision/enforcement gaps.

#

Wholesale and correspondent-related settlement runs through the CBRT's EFT systems — interbank payments and banks' international correspondent transactions settle in the Turkish Lira Interbank Payments System (BPS), customer payments in the Customer Payments System (RPS) — with ESTS for securities, all open to banks operating in Türkiye and benchmarked against BIS-IOSCO PFMI. Cross-border card flows clear via BKM or correspondent banking. Although Türkiye was removed from the FATF grey list in June 2024, international banks that imposed enhanced due diligence during the 2021-2024 listing continue to apply elevated scrutiny, so Turkish counterparties face higher documentary requirements and residual de-risking pressure in cross-border transactions.

Open gap — wpm-int-3No correspondent-banking/access event for TR was located this cycle; coverage gap rather than a finding of no activity.no under-indexing note recorded
Standing sub-brief · as of 27 June 2026 155 words · last cycle 2026-06-27

Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

The analytical spine of this structural module is the bank versus non-bank access asymmetry in cross-border settlement. Interbank and banks' international correspondent transactions settle in the CBRT Turkish Lira Interbank Payments System (BPS), customer payments in the Customer Payments System (RPS), and securities in ESTS, all open to banks operating in Türkiye and benchmarked against BIS-IOSCO PFMI. These settlement systems are a bank-PSP domain; non-bank PIs and EMIs do not enjoy the same correspondent access.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T1https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Core+Functions/Payment+Systems/Payment+Systems+in+Turkey/Electronic+Fund+Transfer+System+and+Electronic+Securities+Transfer+Systemretrieved
  2. T3https://www.businessdataguide.com/blog/jurisdictions/turkey-company-search-guideretrieved
  3. T3https://cashmanagement.bnpparibas.com/atlas-countries/turkeyretrieved
  4. T3https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/impact-de-risking-correspondent-banks-international-traderetrieved
  5. T1Türkiye correspondent-banking and settlement access — Türkiye correspondent-banking and settlement access — Interbank and banks' international correspondent transactions settle in the CBRT Turkish Lira Interbank Payments System (BPS), customer payments in the Customer Payments System (RPS), securities in ESTS, all open to banks operating in Türkiye and benchmarked against BIS-IOSCO PFMI. Despite June 2024 FATF delisting, international/correspondent banks continue elevated EDD, leaving Turkish counterparties with higher documentary requirements and residual de-risking pressure.

#

Trailing-12-month commercial activity led by iyzico/Paynet $87M close, Midas $80M Series B (QED), ColendiBank launch and record ~$219.7M 2025 fintech funding.

Standing sub-brief · as of 23 August 2026 225 words · last cycle 2026-10-04

Commercial Intelligence & Fintech

Two discrete commercial events surfaced in Turkiye's fintech sector this cycle, both carrying lower-confidence sourcing. Aktif Bank's subsidiary Aktif Ventures launched Apilion, a banking-as-a-service API marketplace giving fintechs access to core banking, investment, payments and insurance infrastructure; this is a completed product release, though the amount of any associated investment was not disclosed and the finding rests on a single lower-tier source.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-29

Commercial Intelligence & Fintech

Two discrete banking-as-a-service commercial events are of note this cycle: the GetirFinans/Fibabanka partnership and the BRSA's approval of a Migros subsidiary as a BaaS interface provider for Colendi Bank. Both are product-integration partnerships rather than M&A transactions; no acquisition, equity investment or funding round was evidenced for either. The amount and commercial terms of neither partnership were disclosed in the sources available this cycle, so no valuation or deal-size figure can be reported; deal terms should be treated as not publicly disclosed. These events continue a discernible trend of Turkish delivery-platform and retail brands (Getir, Migros) partnering with licensed banks to embed banking products into their existing consumer-facing applications.

Outlook

Watch for additional BaaS commercial partnerships following this pattern, and for whether commercial terms are disclosed in any future announcement from either bank or retail partner.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and findings (10)
  1. T3https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2025/02/236395-turkish-fintech-firm-iyzico-completes-87m-paynet-acquisition/retrieved
  2. T3https://www.dailysabah.com/business/tech/fintech-gaming-lead-turkiyes-startup-investments-in-2025retrieved
  3. T3https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/tr/pdf/2025/11/Turkish%20Startup%20Investments%20Q3%202025.pdfretrieved
  4. T3https://fintechnews.ae/29780/turkey/turkeys-leading-fintech-startups/retrieved
  5. T3https://fintechnews.ae/29780/turkey/turkeys-leading-fintech-startups/retrieved
  6. T4Aktif Bank / Apilion — Aktif Bank / Apilion — Aktif Bank subsidiary Aktif Ventures launched Apilion, a banking-as-a-service API marketplace giving fintechs access to core banking, investment, payments and insurance infrastructureretrieved
  7. T4Revolut / FUPS — Revolut / FUPS — Reported (unconfirmed, deal-stage) talks of Revolut seeking to acquire Turkish digital bank FUPS as a licensing fast-track into the Turkish payments market; any transaction would require BDDK approvalretrieved
  8. T3iyzico acquisition of Paynet — iyzico acquisition of Paynet — iyzico (wholly owned by Prosus) completed its $87M acquisition of Paynet in February 2025, approved by the Turkish Competition Authority and the CBRT, expanding its B2B/B2B2C offering and targeting TRY 350bn transaction volume.
  9. T3Midas Series B funding round — Midas Series B funding round — Investment platform Midas raised an $80M early-stage round led by QED Investors in Q3 2025, a key highlight of Turkish startup investment activity.
  10. T3ColendiBank launch — ColendiBank launch — ColendiBank, an AI-based fully-digital deposit bank, received its BDDK operating licence in 2024 and began operating in March 2025, offering accounts, payments, lending, deposits and BNPL via mobile-first infrastructure.
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